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Abstract 
It has been argued by some that the distinction between orthodox economics and 
heterodox economics does not fit the growing variety in economic theory, unified by a 
common methodological approach. On the other hand, it remains a central 
characteristic of heterodox economics that it does not share this methodological 
approach, but rather represents a range of alternative methodological approaches. The 
paper explores the evidence, and arguments, for variety in economics at different 
levels, and a range of issues which arise. This requires in turn a discussion of the 
meaning of variety in economics at the different levels of reality, methodology, 
method and theory. It is concluded that there is scope for more, rather than less, 
variety in economic methodologies, as well as within methodologies. Further, if 
variety is not to take the form of “anything goes”, then critical discussion by 
economists of different approaches to economics, and of variety itself, is required.  
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The discipline of economics is continually changing, requiring a re-examination of the 
concepts of orthodox economics and heterodox economics. The particular feature of 
recent change which this paper examines is the appearance of increasing variety, or 
plurality, in economics, in particular in economic theory, and what this implies for 
heterodox economics.  
In this exercise, we can benefit from the unusual degree of reflection on the 
state of economics during the recent millennium. Weintraub’s (1999) approach to the 
subject explicitly drew on modern developments in historiography, which 
acknowledge that different histories can be written from different perspectives; no 
historical account can claim to be the one “true” account. The emphasis therefore was 
on the variety of perspectives in economics and, by implication, variety in economics 
itself. Indeed, such an account provides implicit support for pluralism, ie the argument 
for, or celebration of, variety. But if economics is pluralistic, how are we to 
understand it as a discipline? And does plurality spell the end of methodology on the 
one hand, or set out an agenda for a new methodological discourse on the other? Does 
plurality mean that criticism has no role (“anything goes”), or does it require a 
redrawing of the framework for criticism? What opportunities are offered by 
pluralism? 
The role for plurality had already arisen in earlier exercises in looking forward 
to the future of economics. In 1991, the Economic Journal marked the occasion of the 
first issue of its second century by inviting leading economists to reflect on what the 
future held for the discipline. Among the prescient themes which emerged were the 
following, each of which was explored by several contributors: 
• the opening of economics to input from, as well as input to, other disciplines, 
notably sociology and psychology (see also Allen, 2000); 
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• increasing specialisation within economics (and thus of conferences, journals 
etc) leading to fragmentation of the community of economists; 
• increasing cohesion around methodological and theoretical principles, with a 
move away from the type of divide seen in the Monetarist-Keynesian debates. 
John Pencavel (1991) concluded that these seemingly opposing trends would be 
compatible if we think of economic ideas as being diverse and competing freely in 
competitive markets. He used the term “pluralistic” to describe the outcome, which he 
welcomed as reducing the scope for “[p]rofessional tyranny” (Pencavel, 1991, p.87), 
by implication an imperfection in the market for ideas. But plurality is not universally 
welcomed, since it raises concerns as to how the different types of theory can be put 
together. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p.505), for example, had referred to it as being 
“logically uncomfortable”.  
The concept of plurality has been explored more widely in recent years, both 
within and beyond economics. It is conventional now to remark that we live in a 
pluralist society, for example. Since economics is a social science, and particularly 
given the greater interface with sociology, it would not be surprising to find evidence 
of plurality also in economics. But there has further been the development in the 
economic methodology literature of the argument for plurality, ie pluralism. This 
literature, further, has clarified the different meanings of the term, out of which we 
might understand the different identifications of, and attitudes towards, plurality, as 
well as its implications. These developments in the field of methodology are just part 
of the increasing specialisation within fields in economics, which itself raises issues 
of meaning, and thus of communication.  
The purpose of this paper is to try to overcome some of the communication 
difficulties across specialisations (including methodology) in order to consider variety 
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in economics. First we review the evidence on variety. We then probe further what is 
meant by plurality at different levels which need to be distinguished (reality, 
methodology, method, theory), and then consider the arguments for and against 
pluralism, starting with Caldwell’s (1982) seminal contribution to the modern 
discourse. This discussion throws the spotlight on a range of important issues, 
including the relation between mathematical formalism and plurality. We also 
consider schools of thought as a particular form of plurality. Here it is relevant to 
consider the role of Kuhn’s analysis in relation to plurality and pluralism. In 
particular, while the arguments for plurality are strong, it is argued further that 
unstructured pluralism or eclecticism, understood as an absence of selection criteria, 
or “anything goes”, is antithetical to the building up of knowledge.  
It is concluded that it would be helpful (for our understanding of the current 
state of economics with its variety of approaches to theory and evidence, for 
communications between different approaches, and for future developments in the 
discipline) for the scope for both openness and constructive critique to be more 
widely discussed. This would imply that more economists be aware of, and discuss 
more, the architecture of the discipline. Indeed, it will be argued that, while we 
observe variety at the level of theory and evidence, the reasons for such variety also 
justify variety at the level both of method and of methodology. While their 
characteristics may change, the concepts of orthodox economics and heterodox 




I . EVIDENCE OF PLURALITY IN ECONOMICS 
We start by considering how far, and in what way, economics may be said to be 
pluralistic, drawing on the wide range of commentaries which have appeared in the 
recent literature. In order to consider how far modern economics is fragmented, it is 
useful to compare it with the recent history of economics, and indeed most of these 
commentaries have taken such an approach.  
The conventional account (see for example Colander, 2000a, and Goodwin, 
2000) characterises the 1970s-1980s as a period of fierce debate between different 
schools of thought, often epitomised by the Monetarist-Keynesian debates. The 
differences are characterised as being policy-focused and, ultimately, ideological. But 
contemporary accounts from that period identified a wider range of schools of 
thought, which were differentiated more by methodological approach than by 
ideology alone: mainstream economics, Post Keynesian economics, institutionalist 
economics, neo-Austrian economics, Marxian economics, and so on. There were 
differences as to how to characterise mainstream economics. Weintraub (1985) and 
Backhouse (1991) saw it as being unified in terms of the principles of general 
equilibrium theory (see also Dow, 1985). But Phelps (1990), Mair and Miller (1990) 
and later Snowdon, Vane and Wynarczyk (1994) could identify schools of thought 
within mainstream economics (such as monetarism, new classical economics, real 
business cycle theory and new Keynesian economics).  
 The most notable change identified in the literature some twenty years later 
has been a process of increasing fragmentation within mainstream economics, going 
beyond the schools of thought identified earlier. Colander (2000b) for example 
focused on the movement of economics in the direction of handling increasing 
complexity. He noted a growing divergence from formal general equilibrium models 
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for policy purposes, which was inevitably a force for fragmentation, and predicted a 
move towards more contextual microfoundations, which would reinforce that trend. 
He had already announced the “death” of neoclassical economics as a useful category 
(Colander, 2000a). As predicted in the centennial Economic Journal issue, the growth 
of game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary economics, behavioural 
economics, complexity economics, and so on, had meant that the mainstream of 
economics could no longer be identified as a single theoretical system.  
 Davis (2006) offers an explanation for this development in terms of a cyclical 
process of trade in ideas, whereby variety emerges when imports exceed exports. 
Thus, many of these developments in mainstream economics can be seen as an 
adaptation designed to incorporate ideas from other approaches in economics (which 
had been questioning the rational economic man concept, for example) or other 
disciplines (such as psychology and biology). Since many of these developments have 
encroached on the middle ground between mainstream economics and non-
mainstream schools of thought, Goodwin (2000) questions whether there is any 
continuing relevance in these two categories (see further Coats, 2000). The character 
of plurality in economics had changed. 
 This plurality of theories is also evident in their content, and the changing 
nature and scope of evidence, reflecting an increasing understanding of plurality in 
the subject matter. Thus, by considering the possibility of different information sets 
among different categories of economic actor, rational expectations theory generated 
multiple equilibria. This outcome jeopardised the clear implications which had earlier 
been drawn from the strong rational expectations hypothesis. Similarly, behavioural 
economics took on board different attitudes to risk in order to explain more complex 
behaviour in financial markets. Game theory took on the implications of interaction 
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between different interest groups, and so on. This increasing focus on heterogeneous 
agents reflects a movement away from the idea of the representative agent in an effort 
to capture more effectively a complex reality (see for example Kirman, 1992). Thaler 
(2000) predicts a continuation of this trend. In the meantime, theory change has been 
prompted by new types of evidence that have been gathered on the basis of 
experiments (Morgan, 2005, Sugden, 2005). Further, happiness studies have gathered 
new survey evidence which challenges conventional utility theory (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002). Survey evidence similarly has also opened up labour market analysis to 
concepts (such as self-worth) outside the conventional framework (Bewley, 1995).  
 Nevertheless some see the resulting complexity of the disciplinary landscape 
as being unified by the shared purpose of a general systematisation of agents’ rational 
behaviour (however defined) under certainty and uncertainty conditions, including 
interactive behaviour (Giocoli, 2003). Indeed, while there is a consensus that there has 
been fragmentation in terms of theory and evidence, there is also a consensus in the 
literature that there has been a growing cohesion at the level of approach, specifically 
in terms of method selection. Thus Blanchard, who with Fischer had drawn attention 
to the plurality within macroeconomics in 1989, as we noted above, had by 1997 
come to emphasise the commonality at the level of framework (Blanchard 1997, 
p.582). More generally, Goodwin and Colander point to the increasing requirement 
for theory to be expressed in terms of formal mathematics, which at the level of 
method reduces significantly the degree of plurality. Indeed the consensus identified 
by commentators (such as Morgan and Rutherford, 1998, and Blaug, 1999) has been 
that constructing, analysing and testing formal models is the core activity of 
mainstream economics. Indeed, as Becker (1976, p.5) put it: “what distinguishes 
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economics as a discipline from other disciplines in the social sciences is not the 
subject matter but its approach”.  
 Thus game theory has evolved by formalising different notions of rationality 
(Samuelson, 2004). In behavioural economics, the notion of “rational” behaviour has 
been extended to incorporate what had once been dubbed “irrational”, such as time-
inconsistency and self-control. But the outcome is still expressed in terms of 
optimising behaviour subject to constraints, such that it is amenable to formal 
treatment (eg Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006). The conventional mainstream notion 
of uncertainty (ie risk) has been refined, now incorporating experienced uncertainty, 
as well as decision uncertainty (eg Kahnemann and Sugden, 2005), but again still 
applied within a utility maximisation framework. Institutional and conventional 
considerations are being given more prominence in labour market analysis. For 
example Thomas (2005) analyses labour market behaviour focusing on the idea of the 
fair wage (and thus wage relativities). But the analysis still rests on a utility-
maximising framework where such considerations do not appear in the utility 
function. Similarly it is not clear how the evidence on happiness will be translated 
into theory, not least because of the subjective nature of the evidence. We seem still to 
be in Blanchard and Fischer’s “logically uncomfortable” territory. 
Samuelson (2005) explains the challenges such developments pose for a 
formalist approach, exploring in detail the difficulties in combining the apparently 
conflicting insights from experimental economics with theory. For example, how far 
are surprising results from experiments still conditioned by the abstractions of the 
theory to which they related, and therefore do not constitute independent evidence? 
How should preferences be modelled when going beyond a narrow conception of self-
interest? The importance of addressing such difficulties is emphasised when he 
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concludes that “at some point some connections must be made between theory and 
behaviour if economic theory is not to fade into either philosophy or mathematics” 
(Samuelson, 2005, p.100). The key question will therefore be how far the 
requirements of mathematical modelling are given priority in resolving the emerging 
incompatibilities between theory and evidence. There are after all other approaches 
available outside the optimising-individual framework, as in Davis (2003) on rational 
behaviour, and the two different treatments of the labour market in Chick (1983) and 
Nelson (1996). These approaches differ in giving formal models a partial role 
alongside other methods of analysis (or even no role). Unlike conventional theory, the 
model solution is not regarded as necessarily the definitive solution. One critical 
consequence of defining economics by a particular methodology, as in mainstream 
economics, is that such alternatives may not be recognised as even falling within 
economics. The homogeneity of methodological approach is then self-reinforcing. 
Given the importance, therefore, of unity of method (alongside plurality of 
theory and evidence), we turn now to analyse its justification, as well as significance 
and implications. In particular it is important, given the diverging trends in terms of 
theory/evidence and method, that it be clarified what is entailed by plurality at 
different levels. We do this in the next section, and at the same time consider the 
arguments put forward for plurality, that is, for pluralism. 
 
II. VARIETY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
We have already seen evidence of a consensus that there is increasing plurality in the 
practice of mainstream economics and unity in terms of methodology. So we also 
need to consider the relations between the levels, the meaning of plurality at the level 
of reality, and distinguish between a plurality of methodologies, or approaches, on the 
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one hand and a methodology which advocates a plurality of methods on the other 
(Dow, 2001).  
We start with the subject matter of economics: reality, and the nature of social 
systems, of which the economy is a part. The nature of reality in turn determines what 
kinds of knowledge are possible. It is difficult definitively to separate the level of 
reality from the level of our knowledge about it. Nevertheless, it is possible to make 
statements about what we understand as the nature of reality, and about what that 
implies for possibilities for knowledge. The question at issue here is whether or not 
there is an underlying unity to social systems. If there is, then behaviour is law-like, 
and it is the task of economics to uncover those laws. There is little scope for diversity 
of opinion, or plurality in terms of knowledge, except in the transitional state during 
which laws are being uncovered. Put another way, closed social systems allow for the 
identification of laws on the basis of which predictions can be made with confidence.  
On the other hand if there is diversity in nature, that is behaviour is not law-
like, then there is scope for variety of opinion (that is, plurality of knowledge), and 
thus a range of possible explanations for economic outcomes (Runde, 1998). This 
would also be the case, even if there is unity in nature, if there are difficulties in 
observing nature. Open systems, which allow for human agency (creativity, the non-
deterministic exercise of choice etc) and the (indeterminate) evolution of the 
institutional structure within which individuals exercise agency, do not have the 
invariant kind of causal mechanisms which yield up laws, and allow instead for a 
plurality of explanations and modes of explanation (Davis, 2003; Chick and Dow, 
2005). Many economists would agree with Popper (1982) that reality is an open 
system (or at least, if a closed system, that signals are too noisy to allow us to identify 
it). For example, such thinking lies behind Colander’s (2000b) prediction that 
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economics will increasingly focus on the particularity of institutional context, so that 
we can expect increasing variety in knowledge.  
For world-truth realists, reality is the arbiter of opinion: knowledge can only 
be regarded as true or false by reference to reality (Mäki 1988). Positivism saw world 
truth realism as ensuring unity of knowledge through empirical testing (only one 
opinion could be correct). But it became clear that empirical testing was not definitive 
in settling disputes in science more generally or in economics in particular. The 
problems ranged from the difficulty of identifying precisely which element of a 
hypothesis accounted for falsifying evidence and should be abandoned (the “Duhem-
Quine problem”), to the inability to test all theoretical statements, to more practical 
issues such as data compatibility. In charting the decline of positivism in philosophy 
of science, Caldwell (1982, p.244) concluded that “[t]he most significant contribution 
of the growth-of-knowledge philosophers was the demonstration that the quest for a 
single, universal, prescriptive scientific methodology is quixotic”.  
Different methodologies can be seen to follow from different understandings 
of reality. Thus, for example, market economies can be understood to be inherently 
stable (such that deviations from trend are understood as resulting from shocks, as in 
the new growth theory) or inherently unstable (as in the Keynes/Minsky theory of the 
business cycle). From each view of reality follows a different view of how best to 
build knowledge about it. A stable New Keynesian system with all variables, 
including shocks, identified (a closed system) lends itself to mathematical modelling 
which yields a precise conclusion. On the other hand, the focus of the Keynes/Minsky 
approach on the indeterminate nature of the timing and amplitude of the cycle, and the 
central role given to unquantifiable risk, explains the more partial role for formal 
models (without optimising behaviour) alongside other methods of analysis (see eg 
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Dow, 1998; see Lucas, 1980, for a different view). From these different 
methodologies stem different selection and use of methods, and different theories. 
We can identify four arguments for variety in methodological approach, which 
we will discuss in turn below. The first is to accept its existence as a feature of 
knowledge systems on ethical grounds, whether or not it is justified. The second is to 
argue that no mechanism exists for unifying knowledge about reality, so we have no 
choice but to accept plurality of approach. The third is to argue that plurality of 
approach inevitably follows from the nature of the subject matter, and the fourth is 
positively to advocate plurality on the grounds that variety is essential to the survival 
of the discipline in the face of an evolving subject matter. 
The ethical argument rests on what is seen as a fundamental aspect of 
knowledge (Screpanti, 1997; Mäki, 1997; McCloskey, 1994). If at a basic level we 
can construct knowledge in different ways, for whatever reason, and there is no 
agreed basis for identifying one best approach to knowledge, then there can be no 
justification in presuming that others’ approach to knowledge will be the same as our 
own. To recognise this requires an awareness that reality may be understood 
differently, terms may be used with different meanings, different criteria employed 
for deciding what is a good argument, and so on. The ethical argument then is to 
develop sufficient awareness of difference, first to recognise other approaches, and 
second not to reject them simply because they are different. This is not at all to rule 
out criticism. On the contrary, it is argued that critical analysis which is as “objective” 
as possible requires some mutual understanding (of methodological principles, 
meaning, etc).  
When Morgan and Rutherford (1998, p.8) identified a change in the 
professional ethos of American economics away from interwar pluralism, they 
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characterised it in terms of a move away from associating objectivity with even-
handedness with respect to different arguments (and different types of argument). 
Even-handedness requires awareness of “otherness”. Morgan and Rutherford identify 
modern economics with the rise of technocracy, and an association of objectivity 
instead with the adoption of a particular range of techniques. These techniques 
facilitate direct comparability of argument, but at the cost of precluding arguments 
which cannot be expressed in terms of these techniques. This approach is monist (ie 
discourages variety) with respect to methodological approach. Further the particular 
methodology itself is monist in content in making mathematical modelling the one 
general core method. 
This increasing monism in terms of methodological approach has therefore 
allowed the emergence of a plurality of theoretical approaches, using different subsets 
of formal techniques. But at the same time, it has created a dualistic divide between 
theories which conform to these norms of development and expression and those 
which do not, discouraging mutual understanding and communication. There is an 
asymmetry in that, for mainstream economics, the formalist methodological approach 
defines the discipline, and thus excludes heterodox economics; for other approaches, 
economics is defined by subject matter, and thus includes orthodox economics. The 
ethical argument for pluralism suggests that even-handedness of treatment of different 
arguments should allow, not only for different theories within one definition of 
objectivity, but also for other concepts of objectivity. The partial role given to 
mathematical modelling (or even its absence), along with other methods of analysis, 
in other approaches indicates variety of methodological approach but also variety 
within those approaches. 
 12
In society at large, awareness of variety of approach to knowledge (as part of a 
more general awareness of otherness) rose in the 1960s, encouraged by Kuhn’s 
philosophy of science, and later in more extreme form with postmodernism. Kuhn’s 
(1962) paradigm framework was part of the movement away from positivism laying 
down the principles of best practice in science. Kuhn’s history of science 
demonstrated that science evolves within communities with shared understandings of 
reality, shared views as to how to construct knowledge and shared understandings of 
terms. Interestingly, he suggested that the initial spur to his work came from the 
realisation that later astronomers claimed that Aristotle’s reasoning was nonsense 
because they were applying their own, different, meanings to his terms; to understand 
Aristotle required an understanding of his different knowledge framework (Kuhn, 
1990). According to Kuhn, science progresses within dominant paradigms, which are 
replaced with new paradigms when anomalies with respect to reality become 
insupportable. With the new paradigm, terms take on new meanings and criteria for 
good arguments change. Knowledge drawn from different paradigms is thus 
“incommensurate”. 
Kuhn was generally disregarded by those economists who misunderstood him 
as a relativist, advocating “anything goes” (although the concept of paradigm shift has 
been widely used in accounts of economics in the twentieth century). The difficulty 
was that, if it is accepted that positivism does not provide a secure basis for 
knowledge, and there is no other incontestable candidate for the best approach, then it 
did indeed seem that “anything goes”.  
But there has recently been a revision to the view that Kuhn therefore had very 
limited impact on economics. Fuller (2000, 2003) argues that this extreme relativist 
(mis)understanding of Kuhn encouraged a withdrawal from methodological 
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discussion altogether. Such a move was advocated most publicly by Friedman (1953), 
who argued that theories should be judged only by their predictive power. Making the 
case for an end to prescriptive methodology, McCloskey (1983) argued that 
economists persuade by means of rhetoric rather than methodological principle. The 
implication was that economists did not need to reflect on methodology, nor to justify 
their theories with reference to any methodological principles. This may have proved 
to be telling for the subsequent fragmentation of mainstream economics, as well as the 
relative lack of discussion about it, but does not explain the increasing homogeneity at 
the level of general method. 
In the meantime, postmodernism also influenced to some extent the content of 
economic theory. For those who understand knowledge of reality as being socially-
constructed, there is no independent account of reality which would allow a return to 
an empirical criterion, reinforcing the view that pluralism of approach is the only 
option (Samuels, 1998). Thus Phelps (1990) for example identified the rational 
expectations approach with postmodernism, because of the subjective nature of 
expectations, something explored more thoroughly with respect to Sargent’s thought 
by Sent (1998). Along with the view that there was no one incontestable 
understanding of the economy by economists, the practice developed of 
understanding the expectations of economic agents as also being subjective and thus 
open to variety, or plurality.   
But there was also an argument for a more limited form of plurality of 
approach which did not adopt the methodological agnostic view (inappropriately) 
associated with Kuhn (Dow, 2004b). The emphasis here was on the limitations on 
variety imposed by the social nature of science, ie focusing on Kuhn’s emphasis 
(following Popper) on scientific communities. There is a limit to how far there can be 
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plurality of understandings of the nature of reality, approaches to knowledge, and 
meaning, when knowledge needs to be developed within groups of researchers and 
communicated to others. Plurality in practice cannot be infinite.  
Further, the emphasis on the social nature of scientific activity has encouraged 
attention on the sociology of the discipline, so that much of the activity within 
economic methodology now is some form of science study, concerned with 
understanding the choices made by economists in developing theory and the means by 
which they persuade others to accept their theories. This work draws on a rich seam in 
what is generally classified as the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK; see 
Hands, 2001, chapter 5, for a survey). A key concept in this literature, which has 
caused considerable problems for its application, is reflexivity. In particular, no 
commentary on an approach to economics can be objective in the sense of not itself 
employing an approach. The notion of a market for economic ideas, for example, is 
not objective, given the range of understandings of markets in the literature (see for 
example Vickers, 1995; Mäki, 1999; Milberg, 2001). Thus it is highly problematic to 
contemplate a market for ideas as a satisfactory arbiter of ideas about markets. 
Nevertheless the SSK approach provides a vehicle for analysing the community of 
economists as a society, including the way in which methodological norms are 
adopted and propagated. 
The third argument for a plurality of approaches rests on a specific argument 
about the nature of the subject matter as an open system (King, 2002; Chick and Dow, 
2005). The argument then is not just that there are limitations to the human capacity 
for knowledge which prevent us from identifying a single best approach to knowledge 
which would satisfactorily explain law-like behaviour. The argument is further that 
the nature of individual behaviour (with its social and creative aspects) is too complex 
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to be predictable (even stochastically). Formal specification of the conventions and 
institutions which condition their behaviour to evolve in indeterminist ways, and of 
creativity which by definition cannot be known beforehand, cannot alone be expected 
to be adequate to the task. Further, while it is argued that it is part of the human 
condition not to have certain knowledge (or certainty equivalence), this in turn 
influences behaviour and the evolution of institutions. Policy-makers are then better 
equipped to understand that behaviour, and its consequences, if knowledge is built up 
from a variety of approaches, and indeed a variety of questions asked. 
The fourth and perhaps strongest argument for variety of approach to 
economic knowledge comes from application of the biological metaphor. The 
argument refers to the subject matter only in the sense that theory has to adapt to new 
developments. In nature, diversity of species provides protection against unforeseen 
threats, such that if one strain succumbs to a threat, others are available to take its 
place. In other words, without diversity, the one dominant strain of ideas is highly 
vulnerable to unanticipated developments for which it cannot generate an explanation. 
Within that diversity of approach, one possibility is a pluralist methodology, 
that is, reliance on a range of different methods, on the grounds that no one method is 
sufficient. These methods must be incommensurate, otherwise they would collapse 
into one method. Explicit adoption of this type of methodology typifies economics 
outside the mainstream, although there are differences with respect to the range and 
focus of methods employed. But McCloskey (1983) has demonstrated that, while the 
“official discourse” of mainstream economics conforms to formalism in terms of a 
particular range of mathematical techniques for formulating theory and assessing 
evidence, the “unofficial discourse” relies on a much wider range of methods of 
argument. And indeed variety of methods is implied by Collander’s (2000b) 
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prediction of greater context-specificity of economics, and greater focus on 
institutional variety. Nevertheless the SSK approach emphasises the important 
sociological role played by official discourse. 
The benefits of plurality of method have been promoted in the monetary 
policy arena by the Bank of England (1999) and the European Central Bank (2000), 
following the conclusion that single large formal macro models had proved to be an 
unsatisfactory basis for decision-making in the face of the complexity (or openness) 
of economic reality. This conclusion finds support and elaboration, not only in 
looking forward to future developments in economics (as in Collander, 2000b), but 
also looking back to Keynes’s economic methodology. This was based on his study of 
probability in the sense of uncertain knowledge (Keynes 1921) (see Dow 2004a). 
Keynes argued that in general the confidence we have in particular conclusions 
increases, the more different types of argument, and sources of evidence, support it.  
The relative benefits of a pluralist methodology can be understood in terms of 
a metaphor used by the pragmatist Peirce (Wimsatt, 1981). A pluralist methodology is 
represented by a rope, which is stronger than each individual strand; it is over-
determined in that any one strand breaking will not bring down the edifice of a 
pluralist argument. A monist methodology (that is, reliance on one broad method 
which is necessary and sufficient for good argument, and which involves a shared set 
of terms and shared meanings) is another possibility within the range offered by 
variety of approach. The increasing reliance on mathematical formalism in economics 
in the mainstream can be classified as a monist methodology, and can be compared to 
a pluralist methodology in terms of relative costs and benefits. In Peirce’s symbolism, 
a monist methodology is represented by a single chain, which is only as strong as its 
weakest link.  
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The mathematical formalist methodology clearly has strong attractions for 
many economists. One of the main advantages of a monist methodology is that all 
arguments are commensurate. The appeal of mathematical formalism is that it puts all 
arguments on an equal footing, allowing direct comparison, and a straightforward 
check on consistency (Allen, 2000). However in an applied discipline (and even 
within pure mathematics) mathematical systems cannot be closed, so that internal 
mathematical consistency is insufficient; there inevitably remains scope for variety of 
opinion (Weintraub 1998, 2002). And indeed charges of logical inconsistency (as in 
the Cambridge controversies of the 1960s, see Harcourt, 1972, or with respect to the 
no-trade theorem, see Sent, forthcoming) in practice have not proved decisive. This 
suggests an increasing need for a different justification for arguments to be expressed 
exclusively in terms of mathematical modelling, if this approach is to be sustained.  
The issue of justifying choice of methodology is just one of the issues which 
are associated with variety in economics. In the next section we consider these issues, 
starting with mathematical formalism. 
  
III. SOME ISSUES 
Mathematical formalism 
A discussion of mathematical formalism, in pure theory or as the basis for empirical 
work, can benefit from considering plurality at different levels, as above. At the level 
of choice of methodology, the preference for mathematical formalism which came to 
dominate economics from the 1950s is generally tacit among practising economists. 
Indeed where it is still discussed, as in Allen (2000), it is generally in terms of the 
matter being settled. Yet the attitude to mathematical formalism could prove decisive 
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for how the theoretical difficulties are resolved that we noted above as arising from 
experimental and survey evidence. 
At the level of choice of specific method (within a monist, formalist, 
methodology), there is a range of techniques which could be employed. The reason 
for any particular choice of technique is also generally left tacit; this is particularly so 
at the general level of choosing, say, differential calculus rather than set theory. But 
inevitably such choice requires argument which is in some sense outside of 
mathematics. The choice requires reference to the nature of the subject matter and a 
weighing of the costs and benefits of possible methods of analysis in relation to that 
subject matter. The methodology then cannot itself be fully defined by mathematical 
formalism. 
Similarly, we have drawn attention to something else which lies outside 
mathematics itself: the issue of meaning. The scope for different meanings itself is a 
source of variety, but one which is concealed if meaning is presumed to be held in 
common. Mathematical expression is often treated in terms of translation from verbal 
language to mathematical language, which is internally precise. Mathematical 
argument has the advantage that it can achieve more complex operations than verbal 
argument, retaining precision throughout. But while mathematical argument is 
internally precise, giving meaning to mathematics is not (Coddington, 1975). The 
vagueness of verbal language allows it to encompass shades of meaning, to evolve in 
meaning, and to combine a plurality of types of argument. But if there is variety in 
meaning of verbal terms, and variety in methods of argument, both are lost in an 
effort of translation into mathematics. Mathematical expression is therefore not 
neutral, but rather puts particular limits on the scope of subject matter and of 
argument (Chick and Dow, 2001). Most importantly, meaning in application of theory 
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further remains imprecise and open to variety of opinion. The rigour required for 
application is different from the rigour of mathematical argument, but no less 
important. 
But, while inspection of the leading journals supports the view that 
mathematical expression is indeed a common feature of mainstream economics 
(Backhouse, 1998), this is embedded to a greater or lesser extent within verbal 
argument, as McCloskey (1983) has pointed out. Indeed, the verbal content generally 
contains a range of types of argument. Nevertheless, since the requirement for 
mathematical expression is non-neutral as far as the content of argument is concerned, 
the verbal argument too is constrained.  
But if mathematical argument needs to be supplemented by other types of 
argument, non-mathematical argument is required to explain why one methodological 
approach has nevertheless become the common source of homogeneity in mainstream 
economics. The explanation may be that the growing heterogeneity at the theoretical 
level can be counteracted by a common mode of expression, with sufficient 
commonality of meaning (of concepts like “rationality”) to allow understanding 
across subfields. This would be a particular form of the more general sociological 
explanation that scientific communities adopt a methodology which becomes an 
identifying feature (and we have seen that it is conventional now to say that 
mainstream economics is defined by its method). The community is perpetuated by 
means of education through textbook exemplars, by peer review, by hiring decisions 
and so on. While there is a deep background to knowledge which evades articulation 
(Searle, 1995), a community can serve to create and perpetuate a common background 
among its members and recruits to support a continuation of the methodological 
approach. All of this is the meat of Kuhn’s analysis of paradigms. 
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 “Anything goes” 
The background to this growing homogeneity of method was the collapse of 
positivism, and thus of the possibility of setting up methodological principles for all 
of economics. The troubling implication was that the only alternative was that 
“anything goes” (Salanti, 1997). It is natural for economists to seek firm foundations, 
and to be concerned at the sense that the discipline is developing in an ad hoc manner 
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989; Colander, 2000a). In particular there is a concern to be 
able to settle on criteria by which to gauge progress (Backhouse 2000).  
But one implication of pluralism is that it is not reasonable to expect to 
establish common criteria for progress. What is an acceptable explanation to one may 
not be acceptable to others, not just because there may be different preferred methods, 
but also because the nature of the subject matter is understood differently, and terms 
are being used in different ways. A “pure” pluralist response would indeed be 
“anything goes”, but then it is not clear that we would be left with anything which 
could be called knowledge.  
But in practice, since most economists tend to operate mostly in one of a 
limited range of (shifting, open) networks with shared underpinnings, the scope for 
plurality is limited. There is therefore a discrete number of approaches in economics. 
It is therefore feasible for any economist to learn enough about alternative approaches 
to engage in some communication, and indeed criticism, to good effect. Indeed it 
could be argued that most great developments in economics occur as a result of cross-
fertilisation across school-of-thought boundaries (as in rational expectations theory 
growing out of an encounter with behavioural economics, Kantor, 1979).  
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Communication is not perfect, as across language barriers, but can 
nevertheless achieve some mutual understanding (Rorty, 1979). There is some 
common basis to all of economics (as in the structure of language, to continue the 
metaphor) which provides the basis for communication. This hermeneutical argument 
supports the ethical argument for recognising plurality, and not rejecting simply on 
the basis of difference. But successful communication requires understanding not only 
of others’ approaches to economics, but also of one’s own approach.  
If there is a limit to the scope for substantive over-arching principles which 
apply to all of economics, then each approach to economics is incommensurate in the 
sense of not being directly comparable. But this should not be confused with internal 
inconsistency. As Hodgson (1997: 148-9) put it: “The role of diversity is not to 
sanctify or foster contradiction. Tolerance of the right of the scientist to practise, even 
when we may disagree with his or her views, does not imply tolerance of any method 
and proposition. . . . Pluralism does not mean that ‘anything goes’. . . . We have to 
recognise the immense and enduring value of pluralism within the discipline without 
abandoning precision and rigour in our own work.”  
Surely most economists would agree with the necessity for precision and 
rigour. But the significance of methodological pluralism is that the meaning and 
application of precision and rigour may differ from one approach to another (just as 
Weintraub, 2002, has shown that they have changed within mathematics itself). In 
particular there is a trade-off between different notions of precision and rigour in 
application. Consider a precise projection arising from a formal model with precise 
assumptions, within which classical logic has been rigorously applied. Precision and 
rigour in this sense need to be weighed against precision and rigour as they are 
understood in the exercise of judgement, for example in relaxing assumptions which 
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are unsustainable in practical policy application, such as ceteris paribus. Such matters 
are critical for example in making monetary-policy decisions (see for example Bank 
of England, 1999). 
 
Schools of Thought 
If economics is to operate as a collection of loose communities, rather than an 
inchoate plurality, then it would seem that we would be returning to the 
configurations of the 1970s and 1980s. That period has been identified with 
ideological difference, distinguished from what is seen as the more open plurality 
which prevails now (Goodwin, 2000; Colander, 2000a).  
Goodwin (2000) identifies the declining significance of ideology in economics 
with a growing disengagement from the policy process, which he regrets. But this 
does not address the role of values more generally. Values are an inherent part of 
Searle’s (1995) deep background, which influences the way in which we understand 
the nature of reality, and build knowledge about it, and is thus endemic to our 
economic theorising. It is therefore inconceivable that differences in schools of 
thought would not have some value component. But there are different kinds of 
values, and it is arguably methodological values which are of greatest importance if 
we understand schools of thought in terms of methodological approach. As 
Backhouse (2005) argues, ideology may be understood quite differently in terms of 
the set of values which determine choice of methodology (in addition to ideology 
understood in terms of political preference). Mathematical formalism was seen by 
many as a mechanism for promoting pluralism while getting away from ideological 
debate. Yet mathematical formalism itself reflects what might be called an ideological 
choice.  
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Within this general methodology, it is possible to identify groupings, around 
endogenous growth theory, experimental economics, behavioural economics, 
complexity theory and so on. Each is developing a different set of mathematical tools 
which effectively separates the discourse into schools of thought. The dividing lines 
are not strictly drawn, not least because of the agreed adherence to mathematical 
formalism. Implicit here also is a shared view of human nature. While the old ideas of 
fully-informed, rational, atomistic agents is increasingly being replaced by the idea of 
complex (learning, emotional etc) heterogeneous agents (Thaler, 2000), the 
requirement to model behaviour mathematically is an effective constraint on what can 
be addressed. There are other methodological approaches in economics which can 
also be regarded as schools of thought, for example the older forms of behavioural 
economics and institutionalism which quite explicitly chose an alternative to 
mathematical formalism in order to get round these constraints. These approaches too 
of course suffer from (different) constraints, yet they add to the plurality of 
methodology, of theory and method in economics. 
The divisions between schools of thought are not rigid or impermeable, and 
indeed individual economists may be seen to work across such divides. But 
clarification of broad-brush differences in approach is a prerequisite for addressing 
difference (in meaning, etc) in a constructive manner. It is also useful to use the basic 
classification of orthodoxy/heterodoxy to capture the distinction between economics 
being defined by mathematical formalism, and adoption of different methodological 
approaches, respectively (see Dow forthcoming). 
What is being portrayed here is what could be termed “structured pluralism” 
(Dow, 2004b). McCloskey (1994) has been concerned that we get away from 
structuring the discipline around schools of thought on the grounds that they inhibit 
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discourse. But on the contrary it can be argued that it aids discourse if there is some 
basis, first for identifying, and second for understanding, the principles and 
perceptions underpinning others’ thought, something which is impossible with an 
unlimited range of methodologies. It also provides the basis for effective criticism. 
Awareness of methodological difference is a precondition for engagement with ideas. 
Criticism inevitably comes from some perspective or other, without recourse to 




We have seen evidence that there are forces for heterogeneity in mainstream 
economics (at the level of theory and evidence) but much less at the level of 
methodology. Whether or not there is agreement as to the precise account of change 
within the discipline, it cannot be denied that there has been change. Yet this has 
attracted remarkably little critical scrutiny within the mainstream of economic 
discourse, as if whatever change occurs must be socially optimal.  
 One possible explanation which can be imputed from such methodological 
statements as have emerged (such as Pencavel, 1991) is that there is the presumption 
of some sort of invisible hand at work in a market for ideas. This is a powerful 
metaphor to use in economics, but one which itself requires further examination, not 
least because ideas are not traded; there is no price mechanism through which markets 
might adjust. Indeed this metaphor illustrates well its own limitations. Because, given 
the plurality in economics, there are different understandings of market processes 
within different schools of thought, each would understand the operation of a market 
for ideas differently. In particular, those who identify limitations to the social benefits 
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of free markets, and thus intervention (including intervention to promote increased 
competition) would be inclined to question whether the unfettered production of ideas 
in economics did indeed produce the optimal outcome. While this argument is 
ultimately circular (depending on the perspective of market adopted), so is the 
argument that rests on the invisible hand. Indeed the scope for different 
understandings of key terms is central to the nature of plurality in economics. 
 It has been argued here that the growing plurality in mainstream theory and 
evidence, prompted by the desire to capture more of the complexity of the economy, 
raises questions about the sufficiency of mathematical formalism as a methodological 
approach. In other words, there is room also for non-formalist argument, with the 
mainstream methodological approach only one of a range of possible approaches. In 
particular, the issues posed for formal modelling by plurality in mainstream theory 
and evidence suggest that there is scope for more plurality at the methodological 
level. Economic theory is facing exciting new challenges which are open to a range of 
methodological treatments. The scope to take up these challenges would be severely 
limited if there were an overriding requirement to express all theory in terms of the 
kind of individual behaviour which can be captured in formal mathematics (ie in 
deterministic form). 
In practice any discipline can only function with a limited range of approaches 
(within which there are understandings of the economic process, shared meanings, 
shared views as to what constitutes good theory, etc). An absence of universal 
methodological principles therefore does not mean that “anything goes”, but rather a 
limited range of sets of such principles. This implies that there is a continuing role for 
schools of thought as a way of categorising these difference approaches, aiding 
mutual understanding, and providing the variety on which economics can build.  
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But the main purpose has been to draw attention to the issues posed by current 
trends in economics and to encourage wider attention to them. To leave such issues 
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